University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 18
1985

The Admissibility of Prior Silence to Impeach the Testimony of
Criminal Defendants
Rex A. Sharp
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Rex A. Sharp, The Admissibility of Prior Silence to Impeach the Testimony of Criminal Defendants, 18 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 741 (1985).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol18/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR
SILENCE TO IMPEACH THE
TESTIMONY OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." 1 An arresting officer must
generally inform an accused of this right by delivering the Miranda warning. 2 The criminal defendant may invoke the right to
remain silent throughout custodial interrogation and in a wide
variety of judicial proceedings, 3 including the prior severed trial
of a codefendant. 4 If, however, the defendant later chooses to
testify at his own trial and offers an alibi, an exculpatory explanation, or a mitigating excuse, the prosecutor may seek to impeach the defendant's testimony by characterizing the prior silence as an inconsistent statement.
A number of constitutional and evidentiary hurdles restrict a
prosecutor's use of such silence. Although the Supreme Court
has found that a defendant may, under certain circumstances,
waive fifth amendment protection,'1 it has also determined that
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), mandates that before custodial interrogation an individual must be advised that "he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to . . . an attorney . . . . " 384 U.S. at 478-79. Without this warning, the police are typically barred from
using an arrestee's confessions against him as evidence of a crime. There are of course
exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984)
(holding that a threat to public safety outweighs necessity of giving Miranda warnings).
3. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile proceedings); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police interrogations); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)
(congressional investigations); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (civil proceedings); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (grand jury proceedings).
4. Although the use of severed trials for codefendants in criminal cases may be increasing, support for this proposition is elusive because state trial courts rarely publish
opinions and severence is seldom an issue on appeal. Moreover, few severed trials occur
in federal criminal cases. See LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file, search: severed trial and
criminal; date aft 1980 (10 severed criminal trials); 1981 (11); 1982 (18); 1983 (15); 1984
(14).
5. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926) (finding waiver of fifth amendment
protection for impeachment when defendant testifies at his own trial).
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the use of this prior silence to impeach the defendant may sometimes violate due process. 6 Thus, two constitutional safeguards,
the right against self-incrimination and the right to due process,
limit the prosecutor's use of a defendant's prior silence. When a
court finds that the defendant has waived fifth amendment protection and that due process concerns do not bar impeachment,
it must then determine the admissibility of the prior silence by
applying evidentiary rules to the facts of the case. These rules
weigh the probative value of the silence against its prejudicial
effects. Unfortunately, courts have largely ignored these constitutional and evidentiary principles when presented with the issue of impeachment by post-Miranda silence. 7
This Note focuses on whether a defendant who was called as a
witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefendant and refused
to testify by invoking the fifth amendment can subsequently be
impeached by this silence at his own trial. In addition to the
obvious implications this issue has for severed criminal trials,
the factors considered when deciding whether impeachment by
silence should be allowed generally are in sharpest focus in this
factual setting. Thus, the analysis of the constitutional and evidentiary questions this Note enlists to argue that impeachment
by silence in this context is permissible applies as well to other
situations involving impeachment by post-Miranda silence.
Part I examines the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the waiver of that privilege by a defendant who
voluntarily testifies at his own trial. Part II addresses the scope
of the fourteenth amendment due process protection against the
admission of certain government-induced silence. Part III then
argues that the federal evidentiary rules and, by analogy, state
evidentiary rules should allow the prosecutor to impeach the defendant by using defendant's silence at the prior severed trial of
a codefendant. In the process, the argument suggests relevant
6. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (finding use for impeachment purposes of a
defendant's silence immediately following Miranda warnings a violation of due process).
7. Many courts faced with the issue of impeachment by post-Miranda silence bar
impeachment on federal constitutional grounds without considering factual distinctions
in the cases relied upon for precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580
F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1978) (overlooking that the case relied upon, Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976), involved silence immediately following the Miranda warnings, whereas
the case at bar involved silence long after the Miranda warnings); see also infra note 65.
Other courts similarly misplace reliance on United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), to
conclude that post-arrest silence is too ambiguous to be admissible. See, e.g., Webb v.
State, 347 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (ignoring that the defendant in
Hale received Miranda warnings whereas Webb did not), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 986
(1977); see also infra note 56.
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factors for courts to consider when deciding post-Miranda silence impeachment issues.
I.

FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AND THE

Raffel

WAIVER

RULE

The Constitution's framers adopted the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination to prevent compulsory admission of guilt at one's own trial, like that which occurred in the
Star Chamber inquisitions. 8 The fifth amendment now applies to
a wide variety of proceedings, both formal and informal, other
than one's own trial. 9 The Supreme Court has extended the fifth
amendment to such proceedings because "an inability to protect
the right at one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation
useless at a later stage. " 10
This rationale would also seem to justify affording fifth
amendment protection to a defendant who is compelled, under
threat of legal sanction, 11 to testify at the prior, severed trial of a
8. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974); Morgan, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949).
The purposes of the fifth amendment are:
(1) the deterrence of torture and other forms of outright coercion, be they physical or mental; (2) the enhancement of human dignity by sparing guilty defendants the unhappy choice between harmful disclosure, contempt, or perjury; (3)
the assurance of fairness in criminal procedure by cultivating a proper relationship between citizens and their government-or more precisely, by requiring the
prosecution to develop and prove a criminal case without help from the defendant, and by leaving citizens free from interference until a significant measure of
independent proof has been collected; and (4) the protection of free expression
and association by placing a potent weapon against vaguely directed, roving inquiries into the hands of dissident citizens.
Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841, 848-49 (1980) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also 8 J. WJGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
9. See supra note 3.
10. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974).
11. Whether called by the codefendant or the prosecutor, a defendant is legally compelled to take the stand as a witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefendant. Compulsion is especially pronounced when the defendant has been subpoenaed. It may be improper, however, for_ either the codefendant or the prosecutor to utilize the state's power
to compel a defendant to take the stand. See State v. Nott, 234 Kan. 34, 53, 669 P.2d
660, 676 (1983) (finding error for prosecutor, who knows the witness will invoke the fifth
amendment privilege, to compel witness to take the stand); State v. Crumm, 232 Kan.
254, 654 P.2d 417 (1982) (barring either prosecutor or defense counsel from calling a
witness he knows will claim the fifth amendment privilege); cf. DeLuna v. United States,
308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1956) (holding that when two defendants are jointly tried, a defendant cannot compel a codefendant to testify); United States v. Housing Found., 176 F.2d
665 (3d Cir. 1949) (same).
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codefendant. 12 Consequently, if called to the stand, the defendant should be able to refuse to testify at the codefendant's trial
by "taking the fifth." If, however, a prosecutor can later use this
refusal to testify as an inconsistent statement when the defendant elects to testify at his own trial, then arguably some "testimony" has been compelled. 13 Therefore, prior silence construed
12. The fifth amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination should apply to a defendant called to the stand at his codefendant's prior trial because that trial is
substantially his own. When the fifth amendment was adopted, the practice of severing
trials was unknown, and codefendants were tried together in the same proceeding. Logically, the uncontemplated procedure of severing should not be used to circumvent the
underlying policy of the fifth amendment, where the defendant is charged with the same
crime and faces the same evidence as his codefendant. If, however, the defendant is not
charged or suspected of the same crime, a different result might be reached. Compare
State v. Dodson, 222 Kan. 519, 565 P.2d 291 (1977) (barring use of silence from an assertion of the fifth amendment at a prior unrelated trial), with Viereck v. United States,
139 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir.) (permitting impeachment by defendant's silence from an assertion of the fifth amendment at a prior unrelated trial), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944).
Federal courts have taken three approaches in determining whether a defendant in the
first severed trial may call a codefendant to the stand where the defendant's counsel
knows the codefendant will assert the fifth amendment privilege. One view gives the
judge discretion to decline to call the witness if the fifth amendment is likely to be invoked for most relevant testimony. See United States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264, 1268 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1977). This approach is premised on the rationale that "[n]either side has the right
to benefit from any inferences the jury may draw simply from the witness' assertion of
the privilege." United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir.· 1973). Finding
that the fifth amendment is a privilege of refusal and not a prohibition of inquiry, some
federal courts require the witness to take the stand and invoke the privilege for specific
questions. See, e.g., United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting
that since a nonparty witness is not on trial, invocation of the fifth amendment privilege
is not being used against him); United States v. Stephens, 492 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir.) (finding that a defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him, so he can call a
witness to the stand to invoke the privilege), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974). Other
federal courts have determined that the defendant cannot call a codefendant to the
stand when the defendant's counsel knows that the codefendant will assert the fifth
amendment privilege because jurors may draw improper inferences from the refusal to
testify. See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908-09 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
13. Of course, this silence is an odd type of testimony, because it only becomes "testimony" upon the subsequent fulfillment of a condition, namely that the defendant, called
as a witness at the prior trial of a codefendant, takes the stand at his own trial. Because
it is the defendant himself who, by testifying at his own trial, has turned his silence into
"testimony," perhaps there is no government compulsion. As one judge expressed it:
That one may remain silent in the face of accusation is a personal option, and
a constitutional privilege. There is a difference, however, between silence and
compulsion. Compulsion is never permissible. Silence is a choice, a choice depending upon the facts and circumstances, that may contain risks.
The majority confuses compulsion with "silence." There is a constitutional
protection against compulsion, silence is a choice and a waivable privilege. So
long as one maintains silence, we must, as far as possible, protect it from unfavorable inference. When one chooses to speak, however, we owe no duty to protect against any natural inconsistency that may exist between former elected,
self-imposed silence and trial testimony.
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as testimony might theoretically fall within the purview of the
fifth amendment. 14
This theoretical analysis, however, holds little practical significance because courts need not consider the scope of the fifth
amendment protection in cases of impeachment by prior silence. 111 In 1926, the Supreme Court, in Raffel v. United
States, 16 held that a defendant who testifies at his own trial
waives fifth amendment protection against the use of his prior
silence for impeachment purposes. In that case, defendant Raffel
refused to take the stand at his first trial, which ended in a hung
jury. 17 At his second trial, however, he testified to refute the testimony of a prosecution witness. 18 The trial court questioned
Raffel about his silence at the earlier trial, 19 and the Supreme
Court upheld this use of prior silence to impeach Raffel's testiCommonwealth v. Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 587, 454 A.2d 537, 541-42 (1982) (McDermott, J.,
dissenting). If, however, the defendant does not take the stand at his own trial, there is,
of course, no testimony to impeach. Silence could then be interpreted only as substantive
evidence. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibiting adverse prosecutorial
comment on the defendant's failure to testify); People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 609
(Colo. 1983) (en bane) (deciding use of silence unwarranted on evidentiary grounds). Any
defendant who testifies at his own trial does so voluntarily because the fifth amendment
prevents the state from compelling the defendant to take the stand. See United States v.
Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 777 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Keenan, 267 F.2d 118, 126
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 836 (1959); DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th
Cir. 1956); United States v. Housing Found., 176 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1949).
14. Although the fifth amendment precludes government forced self-incrimination
(guilt), it does not necessarily prevent self-contradiction (impeachment). See supra note
5 and accompanying text. In prosecution immunity cases, the Supreme Court has discussed whether "testimony" is "incriminating" and thus within the scope of the fifth
amendment protection. See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956)
(incriminating testimony is that which "may possibly expose [the witness] to a criminal
charge.") The Supreme Court has, however, implicitly accepted the idea that impeachment constitutes a form of incrimination; otherwise, there would be no need to create a
waiver rule to permit impeachment. See Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926),
discussed infra notes 16-34 and accompanying text. Thus, arguments regarding the theoretical scope of fifth amendment protection notwithstanding, the Raffel waiver rule allows impeachment.
15. Jenkins u. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), expressly avoided deciding whe_ther
pre-arrest silence falls within the scope of the fifth amendment protection because it
found that Raffel rendered the question moot. 447 U.S. at 236 n.2. If pre-arrest silence
were within the scope of the fifth amendment, then under Raffel the defendant would
waive that protection when testifying at his own trial. So, whether or not silence is
within the scope of the fifth amendment, the outcome is the same: impeachment is
permissible.
·
16. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
17. 271 U.S. at 495.
18. The government tried Raffel for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition
Act. The prosecution's witness, a prohibition agent, testified at both trials that after the
agent had searched the tavern, Raffel admitted owning it. Raffel, 271 U.S. at 494.
19. 271 U.S. at 494.
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mony. 20 Thus, the Raffel waiver rule permits impeachment when
a defendant who invoked21 the fifth amendment in a prior judicial proceeding voluntarily takes the stand at his own trial. 22 Although several Justices, in 1957, speculated that Raffel had been
implicitly overruled or limited by subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, 23 the Court, in 1980, explicitly reaffirmed Raffel in
20. 271 U.S. at 497-99.
21. In deciding fifth amendment or due process issues, the Court has never distinguished between passive assertion (silence), as in Raffel, and active assertion of the fifth
amendment. In Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), the defendant invoked
the fifth amendment as a witness before his grand jury, but answered the same questions
at his trial. When considering the constitutional implications, the Court seemed willing
to apply Raffel to an active assertion of the fifth amendment, but instead ruled to exclude the invocation of the fifth amendment for evidentiary reasons. Likewise, in Stewart
v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961), the Court relied on Grunewald to find that the defendant's failure to testify at his first two trials, but not at his third, lacked probative
value sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect. Again, the Court found it irrelevant
that Raffel involved passive silence. These cases imply that the Court equates passive
silence with an active assertion of the fifth amendment.
22. The Eleventh Circuit Court has noted:
Once [defendant] took the stand voluntarily to testify in his own behalf, he
waived the Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to answer questions properly
within the scope of cross-examination under Rule 611(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Under this rule, a witness may be cross-examined as to matters "reasonably related" to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters
affecting credibility.
United States v. Pilcher, 672 F.2d 875, 877-78 (11th Cir.) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982); see also Neely v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1261, 1264
(7th Cir. 1983) (allowing the prosecutor to question defendant on matters reasonably
related to the subject matter of his direct examination, including impeaching defendant's
credibility), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 723 (1984); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331,
1342 (9th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); United States v.
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 907 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (same, but issue not decided,
only discussed), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). Defendant's "voluntary offer of testimony upon any fact is a waiver as to all other relevant facts because of the necessary
connection between all." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2276(2) (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
(emphasis supplied). Regardless of the scope of waiver with respect to substantive evidence, impeachment evidence is always within the scope of the waiver.
23. In a concurring opinion in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan, stated
that "to the extent that approval of such a rule in [Raffel] has vitality after [Johnson], I
think the Ratfel case should be explicitly overruled." Id. at 426; see also Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 338 n.9 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part, joined by Marshall, J.).
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943), did not affect Ratfel because Johnson
did not involve a waiver situation. In Johnson, the defendant testified at his own trial,
and during cross-examination the trial court improperly permitted the defendant to remain silent under the fifth amendment. Although the prosecutor sought to use this silence to impeach the defendant, the Supreme Court would not permit impeachment.
Because the defendant did not follow his silence with further testimony that could be
interpreted as an implied waiver, the effect was as if Johnson had taken the stand only
to assert his fifth amendment right to remain silent. See also United States v. Klinger,
136 F.2d 677, 678 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (finding that Johnson does not limit Ratfel
because Johnson only applies when the judge erroneously grants the privilege on cross-
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Jenkins v. Anderson. 2 "
examination), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 746 (1943).
Defendants have repeatedly attempted to distinguish Raffel from Grunewald because
Raffel involved silence at a prior trial, whereas Grunewald involved silence before a
grand jury. Courts, however, have rejected this distinction. See, e.g., Berra v. United
States, 221 F.2d 590, 597 (8th Cir. 1955) (upholding the Raffel rule because "we discern
nothing unjust or unfair in this rule" and allowing impeachment by commenting on defendant's assertion of the fifth amendment at his grand jury proceeding), aff'd on other
grounds, 351 U.S. 131 (1956); United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 860 (1948); Viereck v. United States, 139 F.2d 847, 858
(D.C. Cir. 1944) (same), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944); Tomlinson v. United States, 93
F.2d 652, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (allowing impeachment by comment about defendant's
failure to testify before his grand jury), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 646 (1938); State v.
Schroeder, 201 Kan. 811, 820-21, 443 P.2d 284, 292 (1968) (same as Berra), limited in
State v. Mims, 220 Kan. 726, 730, 556 P.2d 387 (1976). Because Grunewald is distinguishable, it does not limit Raffel. The Raffel rule is merely a broad constitutional waiver
test. Grunewald, however, was decided on the evidentiary theory that the prior silence
was consistent with defendant's later testimony; therefore, impeachment could not be
allowed. 353 U.S. at 418-24. Thus, even after a defendant takes the stand at his own
trial, opening himself up to impeachment under the Raffel constitutional waiver rule, the
prosecutor may not impeach the defendant unless the prior silence and subsequent testimony are inconsistent under the Grunewald evidentiary test. As the Grunewald Court
noted:
We may assume that under Raffel, [the defendant] in this case [Grunewald] was
subject to cross-examination impeaching credibility just like any other witness,
and that his Fifth Amendment plea before the grand jury could not carry over
any form of immunity when he voluntarily took the stand at the trial. This does
not, however, solve the question whether ... [the] probative value ... was so
negligible as to be far outweighed by its possible impermissible impact on the
jury.
353 U.S. at 420 (footnote omitted); see also Note, What You Do Not Say Can and Will
Be Used Against You: Prearrest Silence Used to Impeach a Defendant's Testimony, 16
VAL. U.L. REV. 537, 543 n.41 (1982) (noting the difference between the Raffel constitutional issue and the Grunewald evidentiary issue). Although the Grunewald Court inferred that Raffel did not consider the question of inconsistency, 353 U.S. at 420, the
Court later pointed out in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 175 (1975) that Raffel
assumed inconsistency. Therefore, any confusion in the law arises from the failure to
distinguish between the Raffel constitutional waiver rule and the Grunewald evidentiary
test.
24. 447 U.S. 231, 237 n.4 (1980). The Jenkins Court stated: "In fact, no Court opinion decided since Raffel has challenged its holding that the Fifth Amendment is not
violated when a defendant is impeached on the basis of his prior silence." 447 U.S. at 237
n.4. No case since Jenkins has reconsidered Raffel. "However much Raffel has been circumscribed and criticized, it has not been overruled, notwithstanding that the Court has
had several opportunities to do so." Culhane v. Harris, 514 F. Supp. 746, 754 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). See also United States ex rel. Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir.)
(noting that Raffel was resuscitated by Jenkins), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983).
Without reference to Raffel itself, one pre-Jenkins commentator asserted that
the Court should hold that a defendant who waives the privilege at one stage [of
the judicial process] does not retroactively waive the privilege for all previous
stages . . . . As long as fair cross-examination is allowed in the proceeding in
which the waiver takes place, there is no reason to permit the use of prior silence
Saltzburg, The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and
Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 204, 205 n.381 (1980). This analysis, which effectively
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Sound policy considerations support the Raf/el waiver rule.
These considerations can be demonstrated by examining the two
ways the waiver rule may affect a defendant. First, the rule may
affect the defendant's decision to testify at his own trial. 25 The
defendant, for example, might not testify for fear that the prosecutor will use the prior invocation of the fifth amendment privilege at a codefendant's trial for impeachment purposes. 26 The
defendant's decision to testify at his own trial, however, would
be only a tactical choice that would receive no constitutional
protection. 27 Second, the waiver rule may affect the defendant's
decision to assert the privilege in the initial proceeding. The defendant, fearing impeachment if he later testifies at his own
trial, may be discouraged from "taking the fifth" at a codefendant's prior trial. The Constitution, however, does not forbid
"every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that
has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional
rights." 28 Instead, the "threshold question is whether compelling
the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies
behind the rights involved." 29 Because the Raf/el Court found
that the waiver rule did not appreciably impair any fifth amendment policies, the defendant's decision about whether to invoke
the fifth amendment at his codefendant's trial should likewise
receive no constitutional protection. ao
Analysis of the two possible effects of the Raf/el waiver rqle
on a defendant suggests that the state's strong interest in promoting the truth-finding function of the adversary system31
rejects Ra/fel, fails to recognize that any witness taking the stand subjects his credibility
to attack as part of a "fair cross-examination." To allow otherwise would allow the defendant, who has the most at stake and thus the strongest incentive to lie, to avoid the
traditional function of cross-examination-testing a witness's veracity.
25. The defendant creates this first burden by deciding to testify at his own trial.
Consequently, the waiver rule puts the defendant in the same position as that of a defendant impeached by prior bad acts or prior convictions. See FED. R. Evrn. 404(b), 609.
26. See Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial Testimony by Proof of Post-Arrest Silence, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 940, 955 (1975) (noting the two potential burdens placed
on a defendant by Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1974), which permitted
impeachment by post-Miranda silence). Allowing impeachment by silence may also entice prosecutors to call defendants to testify at preliminary hearings and before grand
juries. Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 204. Evidentiary rules, however, may curb such
behavior.
27. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
28. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973).
29. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
30. See Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926) ("We are unable to see that
the rule that if he testifies, he must testify fully, adds in any substantial manner to the
inescapable embarrassment which the accused must experience in determining whether
he shall testify or not.").
31. "Truth is the essential objective of our adversary system of justice." United
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dominates the fifth amendment proscription against compelled
self-incrimination. 32 In effect, the Raffel waiver rule provides
that a defendant "could not become a witness for himself without becoming equally a witness against himself ... subject to all
legitimate and proper cross-examination."33 Thus, the defendant
who chooses to cast aside his constitutional right to remain silent must speak truthfully and subject himself to the traditional
truth-testing function of cross-examination. 34

II.

DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON IMPEACHMENT BY SILENCE

Although a defendant who chooses to testify at his trial waives
fifth amendment protection, the fourteenth amendment's general guarantee of "fairness" 35 may still pose a federal constitutional barrier to impeachment by silence. 36 The Supreme Court
has held that fairness bars the government from impeaching a
defendant's testimony with the very silence that the government
implicitly induced. 37 In Doyle v. Ohio, 38 the Court found that
Miranda warnings constitute an affirmative government act that
implicitly assures the defendant that his silence will not be used
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
32. The Beechum court stated:
[When the defendant takes the stand,] "the interests of the [government] and
regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and
limits of the privilege against self-incrimination."... [T]he government is entitled to subject his testimony to the acid test of adverse cross examination.
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Brown v. United
States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958) (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
33. Hinton, Comment on Recent Cases, 21 ILL. L. REV. 396, 398 (1926) (commenting
on Raffel).
34. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
35. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held that a prosecutor could not
use a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence to impeach his credibility at his own
trial. The Court relied on due process and evidentiary grounds, rather than the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to reach this decision. As one court
noted, "Doyle reviewed a state conviction, and was grounded on the Fourteenth, not the
Fifth, Amendment. The court referred to the [Miranda] warnings as being a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights." People v. Free, 131 Cal. App. 3d
155, 162, 182 Cal. Rptr. 259, 262 (1982).
36. A state constitutional due process clause may be an even greater barrier to impeachment by silence than the federal due process clause. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 422 So.
2d 928, 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (barring impeachment by silence by interpreting
the state due process clause as broader than the federal); see also infra note 75.
37. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976). Of course, the defendant must not
only be induced to remain silent, but actually remain silent, to receive the due process
protection of Doyle. See, e.g., Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980).
38. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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against him. 39 Similarly, in Johnson v. United States," 0 the
Court applied this elementary fairness standard to prohibit the
impeachment use of a defendant's silence that resulted from the
trial court erroneously granting a fifth amendment privilege during the cross-examination of the defendant." 1
A.

The "Affirmative Government Inducement" Standard

With an erroneous grant of the fifth amendment privilege in
Johnson and Miranda warnings in Doyle as their only guides,
courts have struggled to determine what constitutes affirmative
government inducement. Because Miranda warnings do not create the right to remain silent but merely serve to ensure that an
arrestee fully understands that right," 2 some courts have concluded that arrest, not the Miranda warnings, represents the
government inducement of silence. 43 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this view in Fletcher v. Weir;'" by allowing impeachment by post-arrest, pre-Miranda warnings silence. 0
39. Id.
[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that
silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair
and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used
to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (footnote omitted).
40. 318 U.S. 189 (1943); see supra note 23.
41. 318 U.S. at 197.
42. "[T]he right to silence described in those [Miranda] warnings derives from the
Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to it." Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560
(1980); see also New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2631 (1984) ("The prophylactic
Miranda warnings are therefore not themselves rights protected by the Constitution . . .") (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
43. See Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 603
(1982); People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174,400 N.E.2d 342,424 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Conyers I), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 809 (1980), on remand, 52
N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 933, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Conyers II);
People v. Beller, 74 Ill. 2d 514, 386 N.E.2d 857 (1979).
44. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam). On remand, the Sixth Circuit directed dismissal
of the case without prejudice because there was no evidence that the defendant had
received the Miranda warning. 680 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1982).
45. See also Conyers II, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 933, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1981)
(barring impeachment only on evidentiary grounds). People v. Free, 131 Cal. App. 3d
155, 182 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1982), however, suggests that Fletcher promotes police misconduct. After arrest, the police could delay giving Miranda warnings to obtain postarrest silence for impeachment purposes, and then give Miranda warnings so that if the
arrestee does talk it will be admissible as substantive evidence. See United States v.
Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1101 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that the police delay in giving
the Miranda warnings was not intentional, but cautioning against creating an impeachment rule that would act as an incentive for deliberate delay). But see Harris v. New
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Thus, by itself, an affirmative government act, such as an arrest,
has been deemed insufficient to trigger due process protections." 6
Fletcher implies that the fifth amendment itself does not constitute government inducement sufficient to arouse due process
concerns," even though an arrested person may know of and
rely on the right to remain silent, without having received Miranda warnings." 8 Jenkins v. Anderson" 9 bolsters this implica- ·
tion. Because Jenkins involved pre-arrest silence, the fifth
amendment guarantee could have been the only possible government inducement. But, consistent with the Fletcher implication,
the Court held that this passive governmental assurance of the
right to remain silent did not raise a due process fairness issue. 50
Fletcher, read together with Doyle and .Johnson,5 1 suggests
that, to raise fairness concerns, an affirmative go_vernment act
must implicitly assure the accused that his silence will not be
used to impeach him. 52 Thus, both an affirmative government
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). "[T]he benefits of [impeachment] should not be lost, in
our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be
encouraged thereby. . . . [S)ufficient deterence flows when the evidence in question is
made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief."); see also Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d
174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N. Y.S.2d 402 (1980). (Meyer, J., dissenting, joined by Jasen and
Jones, JJ.) (finding it "highly improbable" that an officer would delay the Miranda
warnings because improper police practices are used to produce confessions not silence).
46. See Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1981) (barring on due process
grounds impeachment by post-arrest silence when Miranda warnings are not given),
rev'd, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (allowing impeachment); Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d 174,400 N.E.2d
342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980) (same as Weir); Conyers II, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 933,
438 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1981) (barring impeachment only on evidentiary grounds).
47. The defendant Weir may have relied on both the arrest itself and the fifth
amendment in deciding to remain silent, yet the Court held that this did not constitute
government inducement. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam) (finding
that arrest and the existence of the fifth amendment, without Miranda warnings, do not
amount to government inducement to remain silent). Logically, therefore, the Court's
decision indicates that neither reason standing alone constitutes a government inducement to remain silent.
48. See Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d 174,400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980) (stating
that the government promise embodied in the fifth amendment implying that an accused's silence will not be used against him is sufficient government inducement without
the Miranda warnings), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 809 (1980) (remanded in light
of Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), which suggested that the fifth amendment
alone is not government inducement), Conyers II, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 857 (1981)
(decided on evidentiary grounds).
49. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
50. Id. at 240.
51. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. It is also noteworthy that the silence sought to be _used for impeachment in both Doyle and Johnson came immediately
after the affirmative government act that arguably induced the silence. See Doyle, 426
U.S. at 616 n.6; Johnson, 318 U.S. at 192-93.
52. "In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda
wamings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit crossexamination as to post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand."
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act and an inducement to remain silent are necessary. Only
when the defendant meets this threshold affirmative government
inducement test need a court consider whether use of prior silence for impeachment of subsequent testimony is "fair.'' 53
Doyle, of course, deems "unfair" impeachment by silence that
occurs immediately after Miranda warnings have been administered. 54 Dictum in Doyle, however, suggests that silence occurring long after the Miranda "inducement" may be used for impeachment. The Doyle Court noted that silence occurring days
after arrest and Miranda warnings "present[s] different considerations from . . . silence after receiving Miranda warnings at
the time of arrest.'' 1111 Unfortunately, the Doyle Court failed to
articulate what these "different considerations" might be. Similarly, federal and state courts have not directly examined these
different considerations, although many courts have found that
such considerations justify impeachment by prior silence. 56 An
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Greene, 698 F.2d 1364, 1374 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that the affirmative
assurance implicit in the Miranda warnings triggers due process analysis).
53. Fairness can be viewed from two perspectives. A defendant might contend that
the government, through impeachment, is unfairly using silence it implicitly encouraged.
The government, however, may attribute any "penalty" caused by the impeachment use
of silence to the defendant for choosing to testify, asserting that the penalty "was not a
consequence of [defendant's] decision to remain silent; the penalty arose only because
the defendant took the stand." Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714, 724 (3d Cir. 1974).
54. Some commentators have suggested that any unfairness could be eliminated by
giving an arrestee a "silence warning"-your silence cannot be used against you to prove
guilt, but can be used for impeachment of your credibility if you decide to testify in your
own behalf. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REV. 77, 86 (1980)
(citing Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 713 (1968)). But see Kamisar, Kauper's Judicial Examination of
the Accused Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L.
REV. 15, 34 n.70 (1974) (suggesting that the police could not explain, nor could arrestees
understand, a more complicated Miranda warning).
55. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616 n.6 (1976).
56. Early decisions that involved silence occurring days after Miranda warnings completely disregarded the "different considerations" and reached opposite conclusions on
the propriety of impeachment by silence. Compare United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580
F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding, without mentioning any "different considerations," impeachment of defendant's general pretrial silence a "blatant violation of
Doyle"); People v. Eliason, 117 Ill. App. 3d 683, 453 N.E.2d 908 (1983) (same); and People v. Galloway, 100 Cal. App. 3d 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1979) (same); with Franklin v.
State, 576 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en bane) (allowing impeachment use of
defendant's preliminary hearing silence). One commentator has criticized Franklin on
primarily evidentiary and state procedural, not constitutional, grounds. See Note, Criminal Law-Self-Incrimination-Failure to Relate Exculpatory Story at Pretrial Hearings May Be Used by Prosecution to Impeach Defendant's Testimony at Trial, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 632 (1979).
In United States ex rel. Smith v. Rowe, 618 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1980), later vacated by
the Supreme Court sub nom. Franzen v. Smith, 449 U.S. 810 (1980), the court barred
impeachment use of silence coming long after Miranda warnings primarily because the
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examination of these cases, in conjunction with the underlying
purpose of the fifth amendment privilege, suggests that the lapse
in time following the inducement, the pressure on the accused to
speak, and the presence of legal counsel are factors central to
the fairness of using silence for impeachment purposes.
silence was ambiguous on evidentiary grounds. Extending Doyle, but without delineating
any "different considerations," the Smith court found "the fact that Miranda warnings
are given and that a criminal defendant retains his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination is of continuing relevance to the fact of a defendant's silence throughout
the pretrial period." 618 F.2d at 1213. On remand, the court again asserted without elaboration that the ambiguity of post-Miranda silence exists throughout the trial. United
S,tates ex rel. Smith v. Franzen, 660 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit found
it irrelevant that the post-arrest, post-Miranda silence took place when Smith was not
under custodial interrogation. Id. at 239. Again, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh
Circuit Court's opinion. Lane v. Smith, 457 U.S. 1102 (1982). On remand, the Seventh
Circuit found that the trial record did not indicate that Smith had ever received the
Miranda warnings, so, relying on Fletcher, it allowed impeachment. United States ex rel.
Smith v. Rowe, 746 F.2d 386, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
The Seventh Circuit has also permitted impeachment by post-Miranda silence. United
States ex rel. Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935
(1983). The Saulsbury court allowed impeachment by silence because it occurred "long
after Miranda warnings and after circumstances had made the need for an exculpatory
explanation, if it existed, far more compelling." 702 F.2d at 656. But the defendant in
Saulsbury expressly claimed that he had remained silent because of the Miranda warnings. 702 F.2d at 655. The court attached significance to this fact, stating that "(o]nce
that reason was solicited upon [defense counsel's] direct examination it was not fundamentally unfair for the prosecution, upon cross-examination, to attack the credibility of
that explanation . . . . " 702 F.2d at 655-56. Thus, had defense counsel not elicited the
reason for silence, the court may have barred impeachment.
In Folston v. Allsbrook, 691 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.$. 939 (1983),
the court similarly allowed impeachment by silence occurring several months after arrest. As in Smith, the record failed to show whether Folston ever received Miranda
warnings. 691 F.2d at 187. This may explain why the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
because absent these warnings Fletcher would control.

Folston raises an interesting interpretation of the scope of the term "government compulsion." In Folston all of the defendants were being held in the same jail cell. When a
codefendant asked Folston an accusatory question, Folston responded with silence. The
court implied that there was no government compulsion since the defendant was "not
under interrogation by, or even in the presence of, any police officer, attorney or other
government representative." 691 F.2d at 187. This implication, however, may be undermined because the prosecutor permitted the codefendant in the cell who testified about
Folston's silence to plead guilty to second degree murder in exchange for his agreement
to testify against the other codefendants. 691 F.2d at 185. There was no evidence that
the codefendant was a government plant, 691 F.2d at 187, yet the plea arrangement
raises the possibility that the codefendant may have been acting as a quasi-state agent.
Compare People v. Galloway, 100 Cal. App. 3d 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918 (1979) (finding it unimportant that silence was not before a government agent), with People v. Martin, 101 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1007, 162 Cal. Rptr. 133, 137 (1980) (finding that Miranda
warnings, upon which Doyle is founded, are required only when both custody and interrogation are used by a police official).
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The Role of "Different Considerations"

1. Time- Many courts allude to a time lapse as the "different consideration" referred to in Doyle. 57 Read literally, Doyle
says that silence occurring some time after arrest and Miranda
warnings presents different considerations. 58 Proponents of this
literal reading contend that, after time, silence represents a
more careful and deliberate decision than silence immediately
following the warning. Opponents, however, contend that the
passage of time does not affect the strength of the implicit governmental assurance that the accused's silence will not be used
against him. By focusing on time alone, however, both of these
arguments fail to recognize the importance of time not as a factor in determining the existence of "different considerations,"
but as an indication of other highly relevant factors. Miranda
warnings are required only to inform an accused of his constitutional rights when confronted with the pressures that attend
custodial interrogation. 59 The Miranda warning implicitly assures an accused that under the circumstances of custodial interrogation his silence will not be used against him. 60 Although the
passage of time may not change the strength of the assurance, it
often changes the circumstances upon which the assurance is
predicated. Thus, it is not time itself which weakens an accused's reliance on Miranda; rather, those factors that generally
accompany the passage of time-reduced pressure, more information, and advice of counsel-account for the difference.
Even though time may serve as an indicator that circumstances have changed, it seems wiser to consider directly the factors that may change with the passage of time. Two factors,
whether pressure has actually been reduced and whether counsel
has in fact been provided, form the bases for evaluating whether
post-Miranda silence can be used for impeachment purposes.
Moreover, to rely on time as the only factor in determining
the fairness of using a defendant's silence for impeachment purposes would produce the problems associated with all bright-line
tests. Absent other considerations, courts would be forced to decide at precisely what time the defendant's continued silence
57. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir.)
(noting in dictum the difficulty of deciding the impeachment issue if the silence had
been only one day after the Miranda warnings), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983).
58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
59. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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would lose the taint of the prior government assurance. Any
time chosen would necessarily be arbitrary61 and might in some
cases undermine the protection Doyle was designed to afford the
defendant. 62
2. Pressure- The Doyle protection springs from Miranda's
goal of preventing the government from pressuring the accused
into a hurried and uninformed decision to speak. 63 But as the
pressure created by arrest and custodial interrogation64 dissipates and the accused becomes better informed of his constitutional rights, the need for the Doyle rule diminishes. Indeed,
custodial pressure, a primary concern of the Miranda Court,
vanishes if the accused is released on bail. 611 Nevertheless, lack of
counsel may perpetuate the problem of uninformed decision
making. A defendant may concede that the decision to remain
silent long after arrest did not arise from police pressure, but
may still maintain that it was based on the assurances implicit
in the Miranda warnings.
3. Legal counsel- After the defendant has received legal advice, the argument that he based his continued silence on implied assurances disappears, because counsel should advise him
of both his right to silence and the risk of later impeachment
61. Allowing impeachment an hour, a day, or a week after Miranda warnings would
be devoid of any policy rationale based on fairness. The Saulsbury court, for example,
noted that had the defendant's silence been the morning after arrest and Miranda, "the
decision would be indeed difficult." 702 F.2d at 655.
62. A defendant may be in custody without counsel for hours or days and without
any reduction in custodial pressure. Under these circumstances, Doyle was intended to
prevent impeachment by silence. An arbitrary time rule might deny a defendant such
protection.
63. Miranda warnings are designed to inform the accused that he need not make a
hasty, uninformed decision to confess. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
64. Custodial interrogation has two elements-custody and interrogation by a government official. See, e.g., Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). Absent custodial detention,
there can be no due process violation. See Lebowitz v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 974, 977-78
(11th Cir. 1982). Similarly, absent interrogation by a government official, impeachment
by silence of a defendant in custody is allowed. Folston v. Allsbrook, 691 F.2d 184 (4th
Cir. 1982). See supra note 56. Still, Fletcher may indicate that custodial interrogation is
not important because the court there held that a defendant can be custodially interrogated without Miranda and still be impeached by his silence.
65. Of course, the defendant's post-release silence may be ambiguous because of a
diminished need to speak consistent with innocence. Nevertheless, evidentiary considerations, not constitutional ones, should determine the probative weight of such silence. See
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (finding no constitutional bar when a suspect is
not in custody in a pre-arrest context). Silence in response to incriminating questions
other than by the police still may be inconsistent enough with a defendant's subsequent
trial testimony to permit impeachment. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176
(1975) ("Silence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation
. . . . "); Folston v. Allsbrook, 691 F.2d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1982) (allowing impeachment
by silence when defendant was questioned by a codefendant).
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that silence creates. Miranda warnings are designed to promote
a careful, unpressured, and informed decision about whether to
remain silent; this same purpose is achieved by reducing pressure and providing counsel.
The foregoing safeguards, reduced pressure and advice of
counsel, commonly enjoyed by the defendant by the time his codefendant comes to trial, make the use of prior silence for impeachment purposes fair. 66 Because either defense counsel or the
prosecutor will be questioning the defendant who is called to the
stand at his codefendant's trial, some pressure remains. This
pressure, however, is less likely to be as continuous or harassing
as custodial pressure. Indeed, a judge's presence assures the defendant a more impartial listener than the arresting officer or
prosecutor. 67 Counsel may also be present to protect the defendant from undue pressure. 68 Moreover, knowing that he is likely
to be called as a witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefendant and having received legal advice from counsel, the defendant makes an informed and unpressured decision long before
the codefendant's trial. Such silence can be fairly used to
impeach.
A trial is designed to ascertain the truth. Use of prior silence
to impeach a defendant's trial testimony aids in the truth-testing function. Because the defendant has a critical interest in the
outcome of his trial, he may have a great incentive to perjure
himself or distort the facts when he testifies. Therefore, truthtesting functions of impeachment and cross-examination should
be applied with special vigor to assure the veracity of the defendant's testimony. Allowing impeachment by silence after Miranda warnings and after adequate protections have been afforded the defendant to assure an unpressured and intelligently
chosen silence 69 would encourage a defendant to tell his exculpa66. Of course, the trial judge would have to decide whether "adequate protection"
existed before admitting silence for impeachment purposes. For examples of adequate
protection see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
67. See Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980) (finding
that a suspect may find it useless to justify his apparently criminal behavior to an arresting officer).
68. See Kamisar, supra note 54, at 33 n.70 (1974) (noting that Grunewald distinguished grand jury and other "secret proceedings," where a person testifies without the
advice of counsel or other procedural safeguards, from "open court proceedings").
69. After holding that impeachment does not violate the fifth amendment, the court
in Neely v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1261, 1265 (7th Cir. 1983) found "no merit to the defendant's
argument that he was denied a fair trial" (emphasis added), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 723
(1984). This holding indicates that impeachment is "fair" in many post-arrest, post-Miranda situations.
One might argue that the fairness question disappears because the Raffel fifth amend-
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tory story sometime before his own trial. 70 This encouragement
would enhance the fact-finding process: 71 the prosecutor would
not be surprised by previously unknown evidence, 72 and the dement waiver rule also waives the due process fairness requirement. Ruffel demonstrates
that waiver of a constitutional protection can be either implied or express, but must be
"an intentional relinquishment ... of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Once a showing of waiver has been made, the defendant has the
burden of proving that his waiver was not intelligently made. Moore v. Michigan, 355
U.S. 155, 161-62 (1957). Just as a defendant who knowingly and intelligently pleads
guilty waives his constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination, his right
to trial by jury, his right to confront his accusers, and his right to due process, see
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (finding no waiver only because the trial
record was inadequate to show that defendant had knowingly pleaded guilty), one could
argue that the defendant who takes the stand at his own trial waives the fifth amendment privilege against impeachment by silence as well as the fairness protections of due
process.
The central goal of the due process clause is that the defendant receive a fair trial.
This general fairness goal, however, provides a weaker justification for denying waiver
than the more specific fairness requirement, preventing compelled self-incrimination,
embodied in the fifth amendment. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 245-46 n.10
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, because the stronger constitutional protection is
waived under Ruffel, the defendant may also waive the weaker general fairness protection under this rule.
Despite the similar protections of defendant's silence intended under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, the Ruffel fifth amendment waiver rule has never been applied
in a strictly due process context because seemingly different policies underlie the two
constitutional issues. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Franzen, 660 F.2d 237, 240 (7th
Cir. 1981) (finding that the policies underlying the due process clause are different from
those underlying the fifth amendment, so Ruffel does not apply in a due process context), vacated sub nom. Franzen v. Smith, 449 U.S. 810 (1980), on remand, 660 F.2d 237
(7th Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom. Lane v. Smith, 457 U.S. 1102 (1982), on remand sub
nom. United States ex rel. Smith v. Rowe, 746 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
State v. Blevins, 7 Kan. App. 2d 378, 642 P.2d 136 (1982) (finding Ruffel waiver does not
apply to due process claim after Doyle). But Ruffel waiver of due process was never
before the Doyle Court, so the Blevins court's reasoning may be erroneous.
70. This encouragement stops far short of the coercion constitutionally prohibited by
the fifth amendment. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (noting it is
defendant's choice to testify).
71. This is the same policy behind notice-of-alibi-defense statutes. See FED R. CRIM.
P. 12.l(a); Note, Constitutional Implications of Notice-of-Alibi Provisions, 21 WAYNE L.
REv. 1415 (1975). Indeed, allowing impeachment does not raise the strong constitutional
problems that notice-of-alibi statutes do, because notice-of-alibi statutes are often enforced by barring the defendant's alibi testimony altogether-a violation of a defendant's
right to testify in his own behalf. Id. at 1425-26. Impeachment by prior silence at least
allows the defendant to testify. The underlying goal of notice-of-alibi statutes, to prevent
the prosecutor's surprise at trial and to increase prosecutorial discovery so as to assure
truthful testimony by the defendant, is similary achieved through impeachment by silence. Moreover, some notice-of-alibi laws that prevent the defendant from testifying
preclude the impeachment by silence issue altogether. See, e.g., Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d
844, 848 (Wyo. 1978) (Raper, J., concurring) (noting that because notice-of-alibi laws
prevent the defendant from constructing an alibi after hearing the state's case, there will
be fewer alibi defenses and therefore Jess impeachment). Hines v. People, 179 Colo. 4, 8,
497 P.2d 1258, 1260 (1972) (en bane) (same).
72. Defense counsel may, and the defendant will, know of an exculpatory story long
before trial. If the prosecutor is prepared for such testimony, he can utilize the truth
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fendant would not be able to fabricate a story to fit the inculpatory evidence presented by the government. 73
From the defendant's perspective, allowing impeachment
under these circumstances would not violate any constitutional
protections. The defendant could still maintain credibility74 by
contending that either advice of counsel, the Miranda warnings,
or both motivated the decision to remain silent. At a minimum,
he could raise the ambiguity of his prior silence. Thus, impeachment by silence, after Miranda warnings and adequate safeguards, promotes both the defendant's right to a fair trial and
the government's interest in the discovery of truth.
The fourteenth amendment's guarantee of fairness imposes
limits on the use of prior silence to impeach subsequent testimony. When the defendant can demonstrate that an affirmative
government act and an inducement to remain silent resulted in
the prior silence, the court should preclude the use of prior silence for impeachment. The lapse of time between the affirmative government act and the silence should allow impeachment
by prior silence when the lapse of time is accompanied by a reduction of pressure or the provision of counsel. These two factors enable the defendarit to make a decision about whether to
remain silent, based on knowledge that silence may be used to
impeach his later testimony.
Allowing impeachment of subsequent testimony by prior silence also supports the truth-testing function of the criminal
proceeding. Defendants are encouraged to present exculpatory
testing function of cross-examination in a more reasoned and thorough manner. Because
trial is designed to uncover the truth, within constitutional bounds, the prosecutor
should be privy to this evidence early to permit discovery on the validity of the exculpatory story. Allowing impeachment encourages the defendant to divulge the story before
trial, and, should he choose otherwise, affords the prosecutor at least some reasonable
opportunity to attack the credibility of the story if he is surprised by such testimony at
trial. See also Ayer, supra note 8, at 850 n.34, 864, 868-69.
73. Impeachment by silence provides at least some deterrence to a defendant making
up a story to fit within the bounds of the prosecution's case. "To allow a defendant to
testify with impunity on matters he chooses and in a manner he chooses is a 'positive
invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell.' " United States v. Beechum, 582
F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
74. See FED. R. Evm. 608 (a)(2) (general rule on rehabilitating credibility). If the defendant really remained silent because of the Miranda warnings, "he may explain that
fact when he is on the stand." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 626 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.). The Doyle dissenters also noted that
the risk that a truthful defendant will remain silent in reliance on the Miranda warning
"and also will be unable to explain his honest misunderstanding is so much less than the
risk that exclusion of the evidence will merely provide a shield for perjury that [we]
cannot accept the Court's due process rationale." 426 U.S. at 626.
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or mitigating testimony early, preventing later surprise and the
tendency to modify trial testimony to support the defendant's
interest in acquittal. Concerns for a trial both fair to the defendant and likely to discover the truth support the use of the defendant's prior silence to impeach subsequent testimony.

Ill.

EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK

In cases where the Constitution would not preclude the impeachment use of silence, such as a defendant's silence at a codefendant's trial, the only barrier to the admission of this evidence would be federal or state evidentiary rules. 75 To be
75. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam), indicates that each "[s]tate is
entitled . . . to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of evidence the resolution
of the extent to which postarrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant's own testimony." 455 U.S. at 607. And just as Fletcher leaves the post-arrest silence evidentiary question in the hands of the state courts, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231 (1980), gives the pre-arrest silence question to the state courts. 447 U.S. at 240.
Although most criminal cases are tried in state courts, this Note uses federal evidentiary
analysis because federal courts have considered this problem more than any particular
state court. And although state evidence rules sometimes differ from federal rules, federal evidence interpretations commonly serve as guides to state courts. Some states, however, may preclude their courts from following the lead of the federal rules by barring
impeachment use of prior silence in state constitutions or statutes.
A state constitution could prohibit impeachment by silence in two ways. Although improbable, a state could adopt a constitutional amendment, or, more likely, its courts
could "interpret" the state constitution to give broader protection to defendants than
the federal Constitution. Some state courts have so interpreted their state constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, see State v. Roth, 549 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977) (prohibiting impeachment by post-Miranda silence); Commonwealth v. Turner,
499 Pa. 579, 586, 454 A.2d 537, 540 (1982) (barring impeachment by post-arrest silence
even if Miranda warnings not given); In re Silverberg, 459 Pa. 107, 327 A.2d 106 (1974)
(barring impeachment of attorneys at a disciplinary proceeding by use of their silence at
a prior investigatory proceeding), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Dean v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 666, 166 S.E.2d 228 (1969) (barring impeachment by post-Miranda silence); Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978) (prohibiting impeachment by postarrest silence even if Miranda warnings not given); or their due process clause, see Lee v.
State, 422 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (prohibiting impeachment by postarrest silence even if Miranda warnings not given); Webb v. State, 347 So. 2d 1054 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 986 (1977), to bar impeachment by
silence. Of course, a broader protection than federal law may not be possible if the state
constitution is virtually identical to the United States Constitution and is commonly
interpreted in the same manner. Cf. Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424
N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980), decided under a state constitution that was identical to the federal
provision, and Conyers II, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 857 (1981), barring impeachment
by silence on purely evidentiary grounds. See also People v. Jordan, 7 Mich. App. 28, 151
N.W.2d 242 (1967) (decided partially on Mich. Const. Art. I, §17, which is identical to
federal fifth amendment, without citing Raffel); Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo.
1984) (finding that the federal fifth amendment and the identical corresponding state
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admissible under these rules, the evidence of prior silence to impeach the criminal defendant. must be more probative 76 than
prejudicial. 77
constitutional provisions bar impeachment by silence).
Alternatively, a state legislature could pass a statute that explicitly, or implicitly, prohibits impeachment by silence. Although the Kansas Supreme Court has refused to interpret either its constitution or a parallel statutory embodiment of the fifth amendment
to bar impeachment by silence, see State v. Nott, 234 Kan. 34, 669 P.2d 660 (1983); see
also Sanchez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (allowing impeachment, so
implicitly deciding that neither state constitution nor state statute prohibited impeachment by silence), a Michigan court has construed a statute to bar impeachment by silence at a preliminary hearing. See People v. Jordan, 7 Mich. App. 28, 151 N.W.2d 242
(1967) (barring impeachment by silence at preliminary hearing partly on Mich. Stat.
Ann. 1962 Rev. § 27A.2159).
The weakness in a state constitutional or statutory approach is its lack of flexibility to
permit impeachment by silence in extraordinary cases. Although state courts have not
grappled with this impeachment problem long, two noteworthy cases have already occurred. In People v. Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355, 320 N.E.2d 639 (1974), the defendant, a
police officer, had a duty to tell his superiors of his activities, thereby giving his silence
unusually high probative value. See also People v. Bowen, 65 A.D.2d 364, 411 N.Y.S.2d
573 (1978) (same), aff'd, 50 N.Y.2d 915, 409 N.E.2d 924, 431 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1980).
Because such extraordinary cases do occur, a state evidentiary approach on a case-bycase basis is preferable to the rigid state constitutional or statutory rules. This reasoning
may explain why most courts have used their evidentiary rules to determine if impeachment by silence is permissible. Unfortunately, many state courts adopting the evidentiary approach have not followed the more considered approach of the federal courts
when applying evidentiary principles. See Lee v. State, 422 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (barring impeachment by post-arrest silence); Phillips v. State, 165 Ga. App.
235, 299 S.E.2d 138 (1983) (same); People v. Beller, 74 Ill. 2d 514, 386 N.E.2d 857 (1979)
(barring impeachment by post-arrest silence even if Miranda warnings are not given);
State v. Williams, 182 N.J. Super. 427, 442 A.2d 620 (App. Div. 1982) (finding that the
refusal to testify was not "testimony" under N.J.R. Evm. 63 (l)(a)); Conyers II, 52
N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 857 (1981) (barring impeachment by post-arrest silence). But see
State v. Nott, 234 Kan. 34, 669 P.2d 660 (1983) (allowing impeachment but not using
federal approach); Sanchez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (same).
76. Probative is used here as synonymous with "relevant," as defined in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, FED. R. Evm. 401. Prior silence may be probative in a number of
different contexts, but the most common are: (1) to suggest that the trial testimony is a
recent fabrication, see Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (noting that self-defense not
claimed until trial); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616 (1976) (reiterating the prosecutor's
claim that the defendant fabricated a story to "fit within the seams of the State's case as
it was developed at pretrial hearings"); (2) as an adopted admission by silence, see
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975); (3) as a tacit admission, see Gamble, The
Tacit Admission Rule: Unreliable and Unconstitutional-A Doctrine Ripe for Abandonment, 14 GA. L. REV. 27 (1979); and (4) as a prior inconsistent statement, see State v.
Nott, 234 Kan. 34, 669 P.2d 660 (1983).
77. To be unfairly prejudicial, the evidence of silence must raise the danger of unduly
arousing the jury's emotions of prejudice, hostility or sympathy. One court finding of
prejudicial impact observed that "[w]e would be naive if we failed to recognize that most
laymen view an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege as a badge of guilt." Walker
v. United States, 404 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1968). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the danger of prejudice must substantially outweigh probative value before exclusion is
appropriate. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
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Courts, in weighing the probative value and the prejudicial effect of evidence of prior silence to impeach subsequent testimony, must consider several factors. Silence occurring after arrest, while the defendant is subject to the pressures of custodial
investigation, may have limited probative value for impeachment of subsequent testimony. Silence may also occur at judicial
proceedings prior to trial, such as before a grand jury, at a preliminary hearing, or at a severed trial of a codefendant. Unlike
the passive post-arrest refusal to answer questions without the
advice of counsel, silence in a judicial proceeding prior to the
defendant's trial involves the invocation of the fifth amendment
right to remain silent. This distinction requires separate consideration in an analysis of the use of silence to impeach testimony.
In addition to the nature of the prior silence, the nature of the
subsequent testimony and the type of criminal proceeding where
the silence occurs influences the admissibility of the prior
silence.
A.

The Nature of the Silence

Applying the standard that evidence must be more probative
than prejudicial, federal com::ts have focused on the ambiguity of
silence in determining whether silence actually conflicts with the
trial testimony.
In United States v. Hale, 78 the Supreme Court, acting in its
supervisory capacity over federal courts, 79 relied on common law
evidentiary grounds 80 to forbid the impeachment use of silence
occurring at the time of arrest. The Hale Court doubted the probative value of silence that occurs immediately following arrest,
suggesting that it may result from intimidation by the situation,
confusion about what is being asked under such stressful conditions, fear of police, unwillingness to incriminate another, or a
response to the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere of
detention. 81 Decided shortly after Hale, Doyle reiterated the evidentiary finding that silence following arrest and Miranda warn78. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
79. Because the Court decided Hale in its supervisory capacity over federal courts,
the case does not bind state courts. 422 U.S. at 181.
80. The Court decided Hale on June 23, 1975, eight days before the Federal Rules of
Evidence became effective. Thus, Hale relied heavily on Wigmore's evidence treatise. See
422 U.S. at 176. Wigmore's analysis "allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been
asserted." 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
81. 422 U.S. at 177.
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ings may be "insolubly ambiguous." 82 This ambiguity results because the Miranda warnings provide at least one motivation for
remaining silent that is consistent with innocence. 83 One court
has noted that there exists an underlying ambiguity in all postarrest silence, because even without the Miranda warnings an
arrestee may be motivated to remain silent, withholding his exculpatory story, in anticipation of a more receptive audience-such as a judge, jury, or lawyer-than the arresting officer.84 The several possible reasons for silence immediately
following arrest may preclude its use for impeachment of subsequent trial testimony.

B.

Post-Arrest Silence and the Invocation of the Fifth
Amendment

Although a defendant's silence at a prior judicial proceeding
does not mean that his testimony at his own trial is per se inconsistent with the prior silence, 811 invocation of the fifth amendment at a prior trial does not present the same ambiguities as
silence immediately after arrest. An active assertion of the fifth
amendment in response to a prosecutor's question presents less
ambiguity than a passive assertion-in effect, silence-for a
number of reasons. First, because an active assertion of the fifth
amendment occurs in the face of direct accusation, the inference
of guilt is stronger than that drawn from the passive assertion of
silence in response to detention. 86 Second, the nature of the
prosecutor's question may narrowly limit the inferences that can
be drawn from an active assertion of the fifth amendment. Consequently, an active assertion of the fifth amendment, at a prior
judicial proceeding, followed by an alibi defense asserted in response to the same question at the defendant's subsequent trial,
may be enough to raise an inference of prior inconsistent statements. Passive post-arrest silence followed by an alibi defense,
82. 426 U.S. at 617. Hale also noted that silence at the time of arrest may be inherently ambiguous without Miranda warnings. 422 U.S. at 177.
83. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 n.8 (1976); but see 426 U.S. at 621 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Miranda warnings do not lessen the probative value of the
silence when used for impeachment purposes).
84. See supra notes 67-69.
85. See Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 5 (1961).
86. Of course, passive silence can be a response to accusation, such as during custodial interrogation. Police reports, however, commonly omit the exact questions asked, so
silence is more probative for impeachment purposes in the active assertion context partly
because a record exists of the hearing or trial.
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however, might not raise such an inference of inconsistent
statements.

C.

The Trial Testimony

The nature of silence, however, is only part of the inquiry. Inconsistency also depends on the defendant's trial testimony.
Both exculpatory ·explanations and mitigating excuses implicate
the defendant in the crime charged. The defendant has little incentive to volunteer such incriminating admissions. But inconsistency is more likely when a defendant offers a complete alibi,
or flatly denies the charge, because presumably the defendant
has a stronger incentive to volunteer his favorable account earlier than at trial to convince the prosecutor to halt the criminal
proceedings. Therefore, an active invocation of the fifth amendment followed by an alibi is the most probative evidence for impeachment by prior silence.

D.

The Nature of the Tribunal

The Court has also noted that "the nature of the tribunal
which subjects the witness to questioning bears heavily on what
inferences can be drawn from a plea of the Fifth Amendment. " 87
Unfortunately, the Court has not clarified the relevance of this
inquiry. In Hale it merely concluded that the "inherent pressures of in-custody interrogation exceed those of questioning
before a grand jury and compound the difficulty of identifying
the reason for silence. " 88
A defendant's active invocation of the fifth amendment before
a grand jury, however, will not always be inconsistent with his
subsequent trial testimony. Indeed, in Grunewald v. United
States, 89 the Court prohibited impeachment use of a defendant's00 silence at a codefendant's prior grand jury proceeding.
Although the outcome in Grunewald was based primarily on the
factual determination that the subsequent exculpatory trial tes87. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 422 (1957).
88. 422 U.S. at 177.
89. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
90. Although the witness had not been formally charged when he was questioned at
Grunewald's grand jury proceeding, "[the witness] was quite evidently already considered a potential defendant." 353 U.S. at 423.
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timony was not inconsistent with the grand jury silence, 91 the
Court also focused on the nature of a grand jury proceeding.
Grand juries are secretive and investigative:
Innocent men are more likely to [remain silent] in secret
proceedings, where they testify without advice of counsel
and without opportunity for cross-examination, than in
open court proceedings, where cross-examination and judicially supervised procedures provide safeguards for the
establishing of the whole, as against the possibility of
merely partial, truth. 92
The procedural differences between the prior trial of a codefendant and either a grand jury proceeding or an arrest of the defendant safeguard the defendant from making a rushed, uninformed choice to remain silent. Thus, impeachment of such
silence should be allowed.

E.

Rehabilitating the Defendant Impeached by PostMiranda Silence

If impeached by his silence as a witness at a prior trial, a defendant will probably not try to rehabilitate his credibility by
claiming that the Miranda warnings caused his silence. 93 At a
preliminary hearing or a codefendant's prior trial, the presence
of a judge assures the defendant of a more impartial listener
than the arresting officer or prosecutor, 94 and thereby reduces
the incentive to remain silent. Defense counsel may even be present at the codefendant's prior trial, especially if subsequent impeachment is a possibility. After such safeguards are present,
continued reliance on Miranda seems dubious.
The defendant has an incentive to attribute his prior silence
to the advice of counsel. 96 Counsel's advice may be based on a
91. 353 U.S. at 421-22.
92. Id. at 422-23.
93. Relying on the Miranda warnings as a basis for silence, long after the warnings
were given and after advice from counsel, strains legitimacy because Miranda warnings
were designed primarily, if not exclusively, to inform an arrestee of his rights at the time
following arrest when he has few other procedural protections. See, e.g., supra notes 6369 and accompanying text. Although a defendant may show that the Miranda warnings
were a subjective reason for his silence in an effort to rehabilitate his credibility, the
admissibility and, to an extent, the weight the jury gives the evidence of silence will turn
on its objective reasonableness.
94. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
95. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 632 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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variety of legal and tactical considerations that outweigh the defendant's desire to present his story. 96 Nevertheless, Hale recognized that prior silence gains probative value when the silence
occurs in the face of accusation. 97 As a result, silence may be
found to be inconsistent with subsequent trial testimony despite
the advice of counsel. Silence in response to specific questions
posed at a codefendant's prior trial is the most probative evidence of self-contradiction, 98 although the degree of inconsistency will depend on the defendant's trial testimony and the
facts of the given case. 99
Several factors influence the determination of whether the
probative value of prior silence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Passive post-arrest silence has less probative value than does an
active invocation of the fifth amendment. Silence in the face of
general questions likewise has less probative value than silence
in the face of a direct accusation of guilt. The type of tribunal at
which the prior silence occurred influences the weighing of the
probative and prejudicial nature of the silence for impeachment.
The nature of the subsequent testimony offered by the defen96. But to be perceived as a reasonable argument, silence due to advice of counsel
may have to be accompanied by an explanation of why counsel advised the defendant to
remain silent, which in turn may reflect why defendant's testimony would have tended to
incriminate him.
97. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975); see also United States ex
rel. Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651, 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983)
(stating that a defendant who took the stand on his own behalf, "by assigning a reason
for silence immediately after arrest, chose to indicate to the jury that silence had probative weight and removed that subject from the realm of insoluble ambiguity about which
there could be no comment."). This notion of increased probative value in the face of
accusation presents a problem in those states or federal courts that still compel a witness
to take the stand and assert the privilege for specific questions. The more specific the
prosecutor's questions, the more probative the silence will be deemed. Such a
prosecutorial tactic may be limited, however, because the more specific a question is, the
more it may prejudice a defendant by implying guilt.
98. "[T]he context in which a question is asked imparts additional meaning to the
question, and clarifies what information is sought. A question to which a claim of the
privilege is interposed must be considered 'in the setting in which it is asked.' " Zicarelli
v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 480 (1972) (quoting Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
One could raise the counterargument that a defendant would naturally present an exculpatory story when his freedom was at stake, as in his own trial, but not when his
freedom was not directly at stake, as in his preliminary hearing or a prior codefendant's
trial. See Note, supra note 56, at 638. This analysis, however, fails to recognize that a
defendant would likely present his exculpatory story at the preliminary hearing "to persuade the prosecution to dismiss the charges in advance of trial." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610, 632 n.10 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. The trial judge must determine whether there is a sufficient inconsistency for the
evidence of silence to be admitted, see FED. R. Evm. 104(a), leaving the weight of the
inconsistency and its impeachment value to the jury.
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dant also affects whether prior silence should be admitted for
impeachment. Silence will, in most instances, have sufficient
probative value that the court should allow its admission to impeach subsequent testimony.
CONCLUSION

The United States Constitution both permits and restricts the
use of a defendant's prior silence to impeach his testimony at his
own trial. The Raffel waiver rule terminates the protection of
the fifth amend~ent when the defendant voluntarily takes the
stand at his own trial, and the fairness requirement of the fourteenth amendment due process clause forbids the use of silence
resulting from an affirmative government inducement. The government inducement to remain silent, which may be caused by
the shock of arrest, the fearful nature of custody, the Miranda
warnings, or any combination thereof, will gradually lose its influence on the defendant as pressure is diminished and advice of
counsel obtained. In this context, impeachment by prior silence
becomes fair. No constitutional barriers to impeachment by
prior silence exist if the foregoing procedural safeguards provide
the defendant an unpressured and informed environment in
which to choose to remain silent. Therefore, admissibility must
be determined by applying evidentiary rules to the facts of the
particular case.
Recognizing the defendant's incentive to distort the facts, trial
judges already admit most other relevant impeachment evidence, allowing the jury to assess the credibility and demeanor
of the witness. The defendant, of course, may rehabilitate his
credibility by showing that prior silence is consistent with his
testimony. But only by allowing prior silence as evidence of impeachment will the jury be fully informed and able to accurately
assess the truthfulness of the defendant's testimony. Within the
rules of evidence, the defendant as a witness for himself must be
impeachable like any other witness, and prior silence is a proper
and valuable piece of information in making this determination.
-Rex A. Sharp

